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WHERE' S THE BEEF? THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL EFFECTS OF
NEW JERSEY' S ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE

Stephen B. Burbanf<©**
I. INTRODUCTION
New Jersey' s Entire Controversy doctrine raises difficult analytical and
policy questions , particularly as applied to the joinder of parties , when it is
viewed from a domestic perspective. Viewed from interjurisdictional
perspectives , the doctrine is challenging even for one who has probed the
dark recesses of full faith and credit and federal common l aw _ 1 It is no
surprise, then, that a group of recent New Jersey supreme court decisions
demonstrates some of the troubling aspects of the doctrine as domestic law .
A case exploring its interjurisdictional effects, MortgageLinq Corp . v .
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.,2 i s at least a s troubling , both
analytically and as a matter of policy.
I propose to reexamine the interjurisdictional issues that were the subject
of the New Jersey supreme court's decision i n MortgageLinq. I will also
consider other situations in which this creature of domestic l aw may be
translated onto the national scene.

Stephen B. Burbank 1 9%.
David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of
Pennsylvania. I have profited from the comments and suggestio ps of participants i n the
Symposium, including, in particular, Geoffrey Hazard and Linda Silberman, of faculty
©

**

workshop participants at the Roger Williams University School of Law, and, as always, of
Leo Levin.
1.
See Stephen B. B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 7 1 CoRNELL L. REv. 733 ( 1 986) [hereinafter
B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion]; Stephen B . Burbank, Federal Judgments Law:
Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules, 70 TEXAS L. REv. 155 1 ( 1 992) [hereinafter
B urbank, Sources].
2.
142 N .J. 336, 662 A .2d 5 36 ( 1 995 ) . The plaintiff corporation's name is variously
spelled "MortgageLinq" and "Mortgagelinq" in state court and federal court opinions.
"MortgageLinq" is correct.
The other cases, decided the same day , are: Mystic Isle Dev . Corp. v. Perskie &
Nehmad, 142 N.J. 3 1 0 , 662 A .2d 523 ( 1 995); Circle Chevrolet Co. v . Giordano, Halleran &
Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280,662 A .2d 509 ( 1 995); and DiTrolio v . Antiles , 142 N .J. 25 3 , 662 A .2d
494 ( 1 995 ) .
87
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The New Jersey Supreme Court ignored distinctions that may be
i mportant to a clear and correct analysis , i ncluding the court whose judicial
proceedings were in question as F l (state or federal?) and the status of those
proceedings at the time the New Jersey trial court ruled as F2 (judgment or
no judgment?). I proceed by treating such distinctions as i mportant for
analysis of New Jersey's obligations under federal l aw .
I conclude that, o n the assumptions that F l was a state court that had
entered judgment prior to a ruling in F2, the MortgageLinq decision violated
those obligations in two ways. First, as F2, New Jersey failed to give full
faith and credit to the judicial proceedings i n F l . This conclusion depends
on findings that as a matter of l anguage, purpose and precedent, the full faith
and credit statute forbids giving greater, as it obviously forbids giving less ,
preclusive effect to F l 's judicial proceedings than would be given i n F l _3
Second, in attempting to avoid violating its federal obligations as F2,
New Jersey violated them in a different way (and prospectively as F l ) by
purporting to control a matter-the interjurisdictional effects of its own
proceedings -contrary to federal law. Because the court was so intent on
preserving power to deal as it wished with the problem before it, in the face
of federal law, it attempted to surrender power that is conferred by federal
l aw .4
I also conclude that it makes no difference for these purposes whether F l
was a state or federal court, or i f i t was a federal court, whether its judicial
proceedings involved the adjudication of a federal question or a state l aw
question in diversity. Understanding that conclusion, however, requires a
sensitive appreciation of the interplay between federal common l aw and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5
Finally, I conclude that one seemingly critical distinction ignored by the
Court in MortgageLinq-between a case in which the rendering court (F l )
has entered a judgment and a case i n which it has not-may not, in fact,
make a difference to the proper result in such a case. If so, this is a situation
where , contrary to the conventional wisdom, a judgment in F l is not
necessary to the existence of a federal full faith and credit obligation in F2.6

3.
17-75 .

See 28 U.S . C. § 1738 (1996), quoted, infra note 18; infra tex t accompanying notes

4.

See infra text accompanying notes 76-95.
See infra text accompanying notes 96-115.
6. See infra tex t accompanying notes 116-47 . For the sake o f completeness, the
article also deals , in section I V, with situations in which New Jersey is Fl. See infra text
5.

accompanying notes 148-68.
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II . THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT 'S DECISION

MortgageLinq was an action brought in New Jersey state court by
MortgageLinq, a New Jersey/Pennsylvania-based mortgage lender, and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), assignee of
mortgage loans made by MortgageLinq. They sued New Jersey-based
companies and individuals (the "New Jersey defendants") that were
allegedly involved as accessories in a fraudulent scheme involving mortgage
financing on twenty-four properties. All but one of these properties was
located in Atlantic County, New Jersey.
Almost a year earlier, MortgageLinq had brought another action i n
federal court in Pennsylvania, against Pennsylvania-based companies and
i ndividuals who were alleged to be the central figures i n the scheme.7
Freddie Mac had intervened as a plaintiff i n the federal action. The two cases
i nvolved the same twenty-four mortgage transactions and the same scheme. 8
Three of the New Jersey defendants moved to dismiss the state case as
barred by the Entire Controversy doctrine.9 The trial court granted the
motions and dismissed the complaints against those defendants with
prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs were aware of the New Jersey
defendants at the time they filed the Pennsylvania federal case , that the New
7. ·The Pennsylvania defendants would purchase property from its owner for a
purchase price near its fair market value (the A transaction) . The property was
fraudulently resold on the same day to another Pennsylvania defendant (the B
transaction) at a price substantially higher than the purchase price of the A
transaction . . . . In each instance, Mortgagelinq . . . provided mortgage financing
based on the inflated purchase price in the B transaction . Mortgagelinq sold some
of the mortgages to Freddie Mac . . . . Plaintiffs allege that the title companies who
closed title in those transactions must have been aware of the fraud . . . .
MortgageLinq, 1 42 N.J. at 339-40 , 662 A .2d at 5 3 8 .
8.
After the New Jersey state case had been filed, two of the defendants in the
Pennsylvania federal case sought to force the joinder of the New Jersey defendants , either
as additional defendants or as th ird party defendants . MortgageLinq and Freddie Mac
opposed the motion , and the federal court denied it.
The history of the litigation in state and federal courts is sketched in the New Jersey
supreme court' s opinion . See MortgageLinq , 142 N.J. at 340-42 , 662 A .2d at 538-39. A
more complete account of the federal cases, upon which my summary also draws, is found
in Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. , 1 993 U . S .
Dist. LEXIS 405 1 (E.D . P a . 1 993) .
9.
The Pennsylvania federal action was pending-no judgment had been entered - at
the time the motions were filed in the New Jersey state case and when the trial court in New
Jersey ruled on those motions . See MortgageLinq v. Commonwealth Land Title, 262 N .J.
Super. 1 7 8 , 1 8 2 , 620 A .2d 456 , 457 (Law Div. 1 992) , aff'd, 275 N.J. Super. 79, 645 A .2d
787 (App. Div. 1 994) , aff'd in part and rev'd in part , 142 N.J. 336 ,662 A .2d 5 36 ( 1 995) .
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Jersey defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, and
that the subject matter of the two suits was identical . The court held that "the
entire controversy doctrine operates to bar suits against parties which could
and should have been joined in a previous suit despite the fact that the earlier
suit was brought in another state or federal court.''l O
Prior to taking an appeal i n their New Jersey state case , 1 1 MortgageLinq
and Freddie Mac made their adversaries in that proceeding defendants i n
another federal case in Pennsylvania. l 2 Some o f the defendants moved to
have the case dismissed as precluded by full faith and credit to the New
Jersey orders of dismissal . The federal court denied these motions on the
ground that the New Jersey judgment was not final . l3 The court observed,
however, that once final, the New Jersey judgment would be preclusive i n
federal court. 1 4
After the Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division's decision
dismissing the complaint in the New Jersey case, the supreme court granted
the plaintiffs' petition for certification. The court discerned two questions of
i nterjurisdictional import: "The issue is whether the non-joinder of parties i n
a related action i n the Pennsylvania federal court results i n the same party
preclusion in New Jersey [as would occur if the two cases had been brought
successively in New Jersey courts] . If so, what is the effect of that preclusion
in other jurisdictions?" 1 5
The court held that the plaintiffs were precluded from suing i n New
Jersey the defendants who had been omitted from the federal case i n
Pennsylvania, even though they would not have been precluded from suing
them in federal court. The court also held, that this result was binding only

10. MortgageLinq, 262 N.J. Super. at 1 90, 620 A .2d at 46 1 .
1 1 . The Entire Controversy dismissals applied to three defendants , leaving a pending
case in the trial court against four defendants . As a result, the plaintiffs could not take an
immediate appeal , and the dismissals were held not final for purposes of preclusion . See
infra text accompanying note 1 3 .
1 2 . According to the New Jersey supreme court , b y the time the plaintiffs filed the
second federal case in September 1 992, the initial case "had . . . been concluded by
settlements or default judgments against most of the named defendants." MartgageLinq,
142 N.J. at 342 n .2 , 662 A .2d at 5 39 n .2 . However, judgment was not entered against
thirteen of the defendants until July 2 1 , 1 993 . See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v .
Commonwealth Land Title I n s . Co. , 1 993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405 1 , at *5 ( E . D . Pa. 1 993) .
13. Id. at *35-36.
14. Id.
1 5 . MortgageLinq, 142 N.J .

a(

343, 662 A .2d at

540.
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i n New Jersey, leaving other jurisdictions free to permit litigation against the
omitted defendants in their courts. 1 6
With respect, the court's affirmative answer to the first question is
wrong, and, although its answer to the second question was intended to save
the day, that answer is impermissible.
Ill. NEW JERSEY As TH E SECOND FORUM

(F2)

A. Some Simplifying Assumptions
The first question identified by the New Jersey supreme court in
MortgageLinq has to do with that state ' s freedom to treat the judicial
proceedings of another jurisdiction as if they were New Jersey domestic
proceedings for purposes of applying the Entire Controversy doctrine . It will
advance the analysis of the problem to make two counterfactual
assumptions . First, let us assume that the related action was filed in the
courts of another state (rather than i n federal court) -that, i n other words, F l
was a state court. Second , let u s assume that F l entered judgment prior to a
ruling on the Entire Controversy issue in F2. The purpose of both
assumptions is to remove potential obstacles to consideration of New
Jersey's obligations under the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution 1 7 and its implementing statute. l8 Once those basic issues have
been explored, it will be time to return to the even more exotic problems
suggested by the facts of MortgageLinq.
1 6. !d. at 347 , 662 A .2d at 542 .
1 7 . "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts , Records,
and j udicial Proceedings of every other State . And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts , Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 .
1 8 . The Acts of the legislature of any State , Territory , or Possession of the United
States , or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State,
Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and
seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists , together with a certificate of a judge of
the court that the said attestation is in proper form .

Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they ha ve by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken .

28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1 996) (emphasis added) .
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To say that the stated assumptions remove some of the potential
obstacles to full faith and credit analysis is not to say that the court in
MortgageLinq deemed the matters they addressed important, or that the
assumptions remove all such obstacles. Indeed, the court in MortgageLinq
(1) relied indiscriminately on lower court decisions that involved prior
proceedings in state and federal courts and that ignored interjurisdictional
complications,19 (2) barely mentioned full faith and credit,20 (3) disparaged
the precedential value of the only cited lower court decision that did consider
interjurisdictional complications,21 and (4) failed even to note the stage of
the proceedings in

Fl when the court in F2 (New Jersey) ruled.22

If the question had been whether plaintiffs were precluded from suing, in
F2, persons who had not been joined as defendants in a case that had gone to
judgment in a court of another state

(Fl) where they would not be precluded,

it is hard to see how the federal question of full faith and credit could have
been avoided.
Both the constitutional provision and the statute require that full faith
and credit be given to the "judicial proceedings" of other states.23 Although
it is a mistake to regard a court judgment as a synonym for "judicial
proceedings," rather than as a product of such proceedings,24 full faith and

19.

See Gross

v. Cohen DuFour

& Assocs., 273 N.J. Super.617, 642 A.2d 1074 (Law
210 N.J.

Div. 1993) (related New Jersey federal litigation); Giudice v. Drew Chern. Corp.,
Super. 32, 509 A.2d 200 (App. Div. 1986),

other g rounds , 104

certif. granted and summarily remanded on

N.J. 465, 564, 517 A.2d 448, 449 (1986) (related New York state

litigation). Apart from the failure of either decision to consider possible interjurisdictional
complications, the lower court in

See Gross,

Gross

relied on the lower court opinion in

Elsewhere in its opinion in

Mo rtg ageLinq,

MortgageLinq .

1079-80.

273 N.J. Super. at 625-26.642 A.2d at

the New Jersey Supreme Court observed

that "[b]ecause the federal courts are considered those of another sovereign ... [federal
state] cases will also serve to guide us in cases involving proceedings in other states."

MortgageLinq, 142 N.J. at 346,662 A.2d

at 541.

20. "Maintaining a cohesive federal system (and the Full Faith and Credit Clause

melds state courts into that system) does not require that the other parts of the federal
system honor our entire controversy doctrine."
21.

See

!d.

Super. 162,601 A.2d 256 (Law Div. 1991). The

Abatement. MortgageLinq, 142 N.J.
22.

at 348, 662 A.2d at 542.

Kimmins Abatement Corp. v. Conestoga-Rovers

MortgageLinq

& Assocs.. Inc., 2 53 N.J.

court distinguished

at 344, 662 A.2d at 540.

In his dissent. Justice Pollock asserted that "the majority extends unduly New

Jersey's entire controversy doctrine to detennine the preclusive effect of a
rendered by a federal court in another state."
dissenting) (emphasis added). But
23.
24.

Kimmins

!d.

see supra note
See supra notes 17 & 18.
See infra text accompanying note 121.

judgment

at 348-49, 662 A.2d at 542 (Pollock, J.,

9.

1996]

WHERE 'S THE BEEF?

93

credit to court judgments was the central concern of the framers of the
Constitution and of the members of the first Congress . 25
In exercising its power to prescribe the effect to be given to state
"judicial proceedings," Congress has always chosen to tie the measure of
respect required of other courts , state and federal , to the measure of respect
such proceedings have, "by law or usage," in the courts of the state from
which they are taken. 26 Indeed , since 1948 the statute has described the
obligation as giving "the same full faith and credit."27

B. Non-Obvious Avoidance Techniques
1. Labels and Static Conformity
It might be possible to avoid Congress ' directive if the obligation it
imposed were cabined in a way that is not obvious from the text. There are,
after all , unstated exceptions to the statute's literal command. 28 Thus, if the
obligation were limited to the requirements of preclusion l aw , framed as
such, or of preclusion law as it existed in the late eighteenth century, it
might not reach something called the "Entire Controversy doctrine," at least
when used to enforce notions of mandatory party joinder that are
idiosyncratic today and that were unknown and probably unthinkable in
1790 . 29
It would be silly-an invitation to evasion-to permit the content of the
federal obligation to turn on state law labels. Following i n this respect the
25 . See, e.g . , D 'Arcy v . Ketchum, 52 U.S. ( 1 1 How .) 165 , 1 75-76 ( 1 850); M ' Elmoyle
38 U . S . ( 1 3 Pet.) 3 1 2 , 324-26 ( 1 839); Kurt H . Nadelmann , Full Faith and Credit
to Judgments: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REv. 33 ( 1 957).
26. The implementing statute enacted b y the First Congress provided:
v. Cohen,

[The duly authenticated] records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any
state . . . shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the
United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the states from whence
the said records are or shall be taken .
Act o f M a y 26, 1 790, c h . 1 1 , 1 Stat. 1 22 .
27. See supra note 1 8 . For a discussion o f the significance to be accorded changes
made in 1 948, when Congress revised the Judicial Code , see Nadelmann , supra note 25 , at

8 1 -86.
28. "Exceptions there are , but they are few and affect only a small number of

judgments , and no tendency to enlarge them appears ." Robert H . Jackson , Full Faith and
Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution , 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1 , 10 ( 1 945). See
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v . Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 , 438 ( 1 943).
29. This discussion covers both situations in which a New Jersey state court is F2 and
situations in which it is Fl.
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unambiguous tenor of the statutory l anguage, the Supreme Court of the
United States has recently made it clear that labels are not determinative
when considering the domestic law of F1. 30
It would make even less sense to let the federal obligation tum on a l abel
used in the domestic l aw of F2. Thus, historically and functionally, the
application of the Entire Controversy doctrine to parties has been linked to
its application to claims ,3 1 and both applications have been treated , by New
Jersey and federal courts alike, as a species of preclusion doctrine . 32
Full faith and credit would poorly serve its i ntended function as a
"nationally unifying force,"33 and would be inadequate for contemporary
needs, if the statutory obligation of conformity to the law applied i n F l were
static-that is, limited to the law as it existed in 1790 or, for that matter,
1948. Again, the Supreme Court's decisions suggest no such limitation.
30 . "We note . . . that if a State chooses to approach the preclusive effect of a
judgment embodying the terms of a settlement agreement as a question of pure contract
law , a federal court must adhere to that approach under § 1 7 3 8 ." Matsushita Elec . I ndus .
Co . , Ltd . , v. Epstein , 1 1 6 S . Ct. 873 , 880 n .6 ( 1 996) (citation omitted) .
"Without [an] implicit principle of functional equivalence full faith and credit would
be a far weaker instrument than it is and would be of little help in integrating the legal
systems of the states." A. VoN MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE
PROBLEMS 1460 ( 1 965 ) .
3 1 . Indeed, Rule 4:30A , which became effective in 1990, provides , i n pertinent part ,
that "[n]on-joinder of claims or parties required to be joined by the entire controversy
doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the
entire controversy doctrine . . . . " N.J. CT. R. 4 : 30A (emphasis added) . "The purposes that
have stimulated the growth of the claims-joinder rule, which has historically been equated
with the entire controversy doctrine, are similar, if not identical , to those of the party
joinder rule." Cogdell v . Hospital Ctr. at Orange , 1 1 6 N.J. 7, 2 1 , 560 A .2d 1 1 69, 1 1 75
( 1 989) . " [The] commonality of purposes . . . indicates that they are conceptual subsets of
the entire controversy doctrine ." /d. at 20 , 560 A .2d at 1 1 75 .
32. "Although party preclusion is not an exact fit for application of principles of res
judicata (usually the parties must be the same for res judicata to apply) , the concepts are
similar." MortgageLinq, 1 42 N.J. at 346 n . 3 , 662 A .2d at 541 n . 3 . "New Jerse y ' s entire
controversy doctrine is inextricably related to the general principles of res j udicata."
Electro-Miniatures Corp . v. Wendon Co . , Inc . , 889 F.2d 4 1 , 43-44 n .5 (3d Cir. 1 989) . See
also Prevratil v. Mohr, 1 45 N.J. 1 80, 1 87 , 678 A .2d 243 , 246 ( 1 996) ("stems directly from
the principles underlying the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion").
3 3 . Magnolia Petroleum Co. v . Hunt , 320 U.S. 430, 439 ( 1 943) .
The very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the
several states as independent foreign sovereignties , each free to ignore obligations
created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others , and to m ake
them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just
obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of its ori gi n .
Milwaukee County v . M . E . White Co., 2 96 U.S . 268 , 276-77 (1935) .
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Indeed, the 1980 case in which the Court rediscovered the statute presented a
problem of non-mutual i ssue preclusion, a distinctly modem development. 34
The Court's most recent full faith and credit decision involved the preclusive
effect of a state court judgment approving the settlement of a class action on
claims within exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction.35 That is a
scenario as far removed from 1790 as is the composition of this article on a
computer.
2. "Core" Rules and Policies
Another rationale for avoiding full faith and credit should be considered.
It may be related to the last but is more sophisticated. Professor Cooper, an
acute student of and commentator on the domestic and interjurisdictional l aw
of preclusion, has suggested that the federal obligation should be confined to
the "central core" of preclusion doctrine. 36 He proposes leaving state (and
federal) courts i n the position of F2 free to ignore aspects of preclusion
doctrine followed by F1 that implicate neither the "core values of finality,
repose, and reliance;•37 nor the power of F1 to control its own procedures .
For example, if F1 would permit nonmutual issue preclusion, Professor
Cooper would not require F2 to do the same.
The

major values served by nonmutual preclusion lie in the public costs of

relitigation and the fear of inconsistency. A later court should be free to
assume the costs of relitigation. And a firs t court should not be able to
inflict on others its timorous fears of being proved wrong . 38

Although i ntriguing and advanced with the author's customary refined
judgment, the notion that there should be an exception to full faith and credit
for some matters of preclusion deemed outside the "core" is problematic. It
is not enough to observe that the proposal finds no explicit support in the
full faith and credit statute or in Supreme Court decisions i nterpreting it.
For, there are unstated exceptions, albeit very few now, to the l iteral
command, and Professor Cooper invokes the "sorry history of workers'
34. See Allen v. McCurry , 449 U.S. 90 (1980). For the "rediscovery" of the ful l faith
and credit statute , see Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 1, at 8 01.
3 5 . See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein , 116 S. Ct. 87 3 (1996).
36. 18 CHARLES A. WRJGHT ET AL . , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4467, at 625
(1981) [hereinafter E. CoOPER] .
3 7 . /d. at 636.
38 . /d. § 4465 , at 617 (footnote omitted); see id. § 4467, at 642-43.
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compensation cases" as "slight Supreme Court support for the proposition
that a l ater state can narrow the preclusion rules that a prior state would
apply to its own judgment."39
It also may be "not convincing" to argue "that full faith and credit
demands a simple, clear, and unwavering standard , that if any departure i s
permitted from the law of the judgment court other states will substitute their
own rules so often as to weaken the core of full faith and credit."40 These are
not, however, the only reasons to reject the proposal .
Professor Cooper makes judgments about the status of preclusion rules
on the basis of a consideration of policies -finality, repose , and reliance-he
deems central to the body of doctrine as a whole. Obviously , however, there
is room for disagreement about both the most important preclusion policies
and the most important rules, particularly over time. As an example of the
difficulty of drawing lines (or circles), whatever one thinks of Professor
Cooper' s dispatch of the preclusion policy of "protect[ing] overworked
courts ," 4 1 his treatment of the policy is very much the work of an academic
and , as he himself seems to recognize,
very much out of step with
.
contemporary judicial attitudes.42
Moreover, Professor Cooper sometimes seems to regard the policies
animating domestic preclusion law as fungible with, and exhausting, the
interjurisdictional policies animating full faith and credit.43 Yet, the full
faith and credit obligation is not limited to "judicial proceedings ," let alone
to judgments.44 Moreover, a broader policy underlying the obligation that
has not changed over time and that is independent of any discrete preclusion
value is the policy of unifying or integrating the several states .45 "It serves
39.
40.
41 .
42 .

/d. § 4467 , at 638 .
/d. at 648.
!d.§ 4403, at 14.
See id.; id. a t 2 1 . "Economy o f the time of the courts i s one of the obvious
beneficial results of the doctrine , and this feature becomes increasingly important as work
crowds more and more on our overburdened tribunals . . . ." Robert von Moschzisker, Res
Judicata , 38 YALELJ. 299, 300 ( 1 929) (emphasis added) (yes, 1929!) .

43. Thus , he refers interchangeably to the "core of full faith and credit," E . COOPER,
supra note 36, § 4467 , at 628, and the "core of res judicata." /d. at 630.

For discussion of a similar phenomenon in connection with the recognition of
internationally foreign judgments, see Burbank , Sources, supra note 1 , at 1 582-87 .
44 . See supra notes 1 7 & 1 8; supra text accompanying note 24.
45 . See supra note 33 and accompanying text; A . VoN MEHREN & D . TRAliTMAN ,
supra note 30, at 1458- 66 . Although observing that " [o]ne purpose of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause is to bring an end to litigation," Justice White confirmed that " [p]erhaps [its]
major purpose . . . is to act as a nationally unifying force." Thomas v. Wash ington Gas
Light Co . , 448 U.S. 261 , 288-89 ( 1 980) (White, J., concurring) .
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to coordinate the administration of justice among the several i ndependent
legal systems which exist in our Federation."46 Presumably, it is the l atter
policy that leads Professor Cooper to acknowledge the wisdom of requiring
F2 to follow F l 's preclusion rules that, although not part of the "core,"
nevertheless i mplicate F l 's power to control its own procedures.47 He
should not stop there.
Consider again the example of nonmutual issue preclusion used by
Professor Cooper as one illustration of rules far from the core that F2 should
not be required to follow. Fl permits nonmutual issue preclusion; according
to Professor Cooper, F2 should be "free to assume the costs of
relitigation."48 He reaches that conclusion by discounting for full faith and
credit purposes the policy of reducing "the public costs of l itigation," and by
disparaging the "fear of inconsistency .''49 He also fails to consider the
interjuri sdictional implications of the fact that, as he recognizes in the
domestic context, "once the rules of nonmutual preclusion are established
they may generate substantial consequences of repose."50
Preclusion policies aside , Professor Cooper does not attempt to reconcile
his view that F2 should be permitted to relitigate with the federal full faith
and credit policy of unifying the several states. The abolition of mutuality
encourages attempts to settle legal issues affecting many persons in one
proceeding .5 1 Having incurred substantial costs incident to such an attempt,
Fl is not likely to be mollified by the argument that F2 wil l bear the costs of
relitigation,52 or to agree with the notion that the policy stakes are limited to
its "timorous fears of being proved wrong."53
Finally, even if the Supreme Court of the United States adopted
Professor Cooper's proposal to limit F2's full faith and credit obligation, the
exception or exemption seemingly would not apply here. Granted that New
46. Jackson , supra note 28, at 2 . See id. at 2 1 -34 ("Legislative Power Better to
Integrate Our Legal Systems") .
47. See E. CoOPER , supra note 36, § 4467 , at 625 , 636, 644. Cf. id. at 647-48 (greater
preclusive effect) .
48. See supra text accompanying note 38 .

49. See E . CoOPER, supra note 36, § 4465 , at 6 1 7 .
50. /d. § 4403, at 1 6. "Not only may nonparties breathe freer, they may direct their
future conduct according to the results of an adjudication between strangers ." /d. at 1 6- 1 7 .
5 1 . See , e.g . , Friends for All Children, Inc. v . Lockheed Aircraft Corp . , 497 F . Supp.
3 1 3 ( D . D . C. 1 980) , rev'd, 658 F.2d 835 (D . C. Cir. 198 1 ) , cert. denied, 455 U . S . 994 ( 1 982).
52. Cf. Thomas v . Washington Gas Light Co . , 448 U.S. 26 1 , 29 3 ( 1 980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("Otherwise . . . Virgin ia's efforts and expense on an applicant's behalf are

wasted when that applicant obtains a duplicative remedy in another State .") .
5 3 . See supra text accompanying note 3 8 .
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Jersey's broad mandatory party joinder scheme is unusual , if not unique, and
might not be thought part of the core,5 4 the referent for the full faith and
credit obligation is the law applied in Fl . In MortgageLinq and my
hypothetical variant involving a state court judgment, the l aw of F l is the
traditional rule of no preclusion with respect to persons not made parties .
Tradition may not be determinative of status for these purposes. Yet,
consideration of Professor Cooper's proposal reminds us that the effect of
applying the Entire Controversy doctrine to parties is to preclude claims _55
In any event, as we shall see, adherence to F l 's rules may be necessary to
preserve its power to control its own procedures.
With these possible avoidance techniques out of the way , we may now
tum to two more formidable arguments that might save New Jersey from
violation of federal law.

C. Greater Preclusive Effect
The paradigmatic full faith and credit violation occurs when a state gives
less preclusive effect to the judicial proceedings of another state than they
would be given in the courts of the state from which they are taken.
Historically, the concern was that some states were either ignoring, or
allowing the ready impeachment of, money judgments secured in other
states.5 6 For an example that captures modem developments i n preclusion
l aw , assume that F2's domestic preclusion law still permits a person i njured
in an automobile accident to sue the same defendant separately for damages
to the person and damages to property, while F l follows the modem
approach and does not permit such splitting .5 7 F2 would violate the full faith
and credit statute if it permitted a suit for property damage against the same
defendant whom the plaintiff had previously sued for personal i njuries in F l .
My hypothetical variant of MortgageLinq is different i n that, i f New
Jersey were permitted to apply its domestic law-the Entire Controversy
doctrine-the result would not be less preclusive effect but greater

54. But see E. COOPER, supra note 36, § 4467 , at 641 ("procedural desire to frame
comprehensive litigation in the initial forum . . . deserves full faith and credit support"); id.
at 643 (arguing for obligation to respect compulsory counterclaim rule of another state
"since the purpose of such rules is not only procedural convenience for the first court but
also to gain the repose values inherent in settling all related accounts between the parties") .
55 . See supra note 3 1 and accompanying text.
5 6. See, e.g., Nadelmann , supra note 25 .
5 7. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§§ 24-25 (1982).
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preclusive effect. The plaintiff would be precluded from suing in F2 parties
he could sue in F l .
I f the only policies underlying full faith and credit were the policies of
domestic preclusion l aw, it would be difficult to locate the harm, and hence
difficult to conclude that there had been a violation of federal l aw , i n this
situation.5 8 Some scholars have been down this road , reasoning that there is
no federal barrier to greater preclusive effect.59 In my view, however, the
arguments are ultimately unpersuasive whether the rule of greater preclusive
effect they support is broad or narrow in scope.60
The First Congress chose to give content to the constitutional obligation
not by requiring F2 to apply the law that would be applied in F2,6 1 but by
requiring F2 to apply the l aw that would be applied in F l .62 Disregarding
implications of the statutory command to give the "same full faith and

5 8. "After all, if the recognizing jurisdiction's law calls for preclusion, the shared
goal of putting an end to litigation will be served , and the rendering j urisdiction will have
no complaint." B urbank, Sources, supra note 1 , at 1 5 85 (footnote omitted) .

59. See, e.g . , Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate Preclusion by Prior Litigation, 74 Nw. U.
742, 749-53 (1979); David P . Currie, Res Judicata: The Neg lected Defense, 45 U.
Cm . L. REv. 3 1 7 , 3 26-27 ( 1 978) . Professor Currie also considers counter-arguments .
60 . Professor Cooper, whose discussion of this problem is linked to his discussion of
L. REv.

"core" rules and policies , would permit some scope for greater effect, depending upon the
precise question. See E. CcxwER , supra note 36, § 4467 , at 644-48. Professor Cooper has
since acknowledged that "[r]ecent Supreme Court decisions dealing with the effect of state
court j udgments in federal litigation strongly suggest that the full faith and credit statute
forbids a second court from giving greater preclusive effect than would be given by the

court that rendered the judgment." /d. at § 4467, at 454 (Supp. 1 996) .
6 1 . "Without more , i t would be reasonable to argue that all o f the nationalizing
purposes of full faith and credit could be served by requiring a second state to honor

judgments from other states by direct enforcement and by affording the same res judicata
protections as arise from its own judgments ." /d. at § 4467, at 637 .
62. For analysis and discussion of the theoretical and practical differences between
this formulation and the erroneous interpretation of the statute in recent decisions of the
Supreme Court, whereby F2 is directed to apply the domestic preclusion law of F l , see
B urbank, lnterjurisdictiona l Preclusion, supra note 1 , at 797-829; Burbank, Sources , supra
note 1 , at 1 556-7 1 .

100

RUTGERS LA W JO URNAL

[Vol . 28:87

credit" i n F2 as would be given in F 1 ,63 there has never been any basis i n
the statute's l anguage for construing the obligation a s a one way street.64
Numerous Supreme Court opinions, both old and new, i n dictum and
holding, oppose the noti on that F2 is free to give greater preclu sive effect.65
Included among the more recent statements to that effect is a concurring
opinion by Justice White expressing the wish that it were possible to give
greater precl usive effect, but the conviction that it was foreclosed by the
"long standing" "contrary construction of§ 1738.'>66
The Court's construction is supported by considerations relating to the
statute's integrative role .67 Party joinder rules reflect adjustments among
policies that may be in te nsion, if not in conflict. They are policies that relate
to efficient adjudication, fairness , and party autonomy . 6 8 The rule on
necessary and i ndispens able parties, in particular,
is administered against the background of an often unstated but very
important premise: Pe rsons suffering similar injuries ordinarily do not have
to j oin in seeking to redress their injuries through litigation, and a n inj u red
person is ordinarily not required to bring suit against all who might be
liable for the injury. The "pl aintiff autonomy" premise is the point of
69
departure for the necessary parties rule.

Whatever policies animate them, party joinder rules are considered and
relied on by prospective plaintiffs before commencing litigation, and by
those who have been made parties when considering subsequent moves.
When making these calculations , parties advised by competent attorneys
63 . The implications should be disregarded because the changes made to yield this
language in 1948 were called "[c]hanges . . . in phraseology." H.R. REP. No . 80-308 ( 1 st
Sess . ) at A 1 50 ( 1 947). More over, " (t]he addition of ' full ' can narrow down the command.
To the extent that the Full Faith and Credit clause is self-executing, any such narrowing
down would have to be discarded as in contravention of the command by the Constitution."
Nadelman n , supra note 25 , at 83.
64. See supra note 26.
65 . See , e .g . , Marrese v . American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373
( 1 985); Union & Planters ' Bank v . Memphis, 1 89 U.S. 7 1 ( 1 903); B urbank,
lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at 803-04.

66 . Migra v . Warren City Sch . Dist. Bd. of Educ . , 465 U.S. 75 , 88 ( 1 984) (White, J.,
concurring) .
67 . See supra text accompanying note 45.
68 . See f'LEMING JAMEs, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE ch . 10 (4th ed. 1 992)
[hereinafter F. JAMES ET AL.].
69. /d. § 10. 1 2 , at 528 (footnote omitted) .
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consider the preclusive consequences that party joinder decisions may entail ,
just as they consider such matters i n connection with decisions about the
joinder of claims . Thus , tying the federal obligation to the preclusive effects
in F l is essential from the point of view of predictability. "From the
perspective of litigants . . . a system of preclusion rules . . . keyed to the
locus of subsequent litigation would be hopeless , either because it would be
unpredictable or because i t would be , functionally, a sham.'•70
To permit New Jersey, as F2, to preclude where F l would not do so
might advance the preclusion policies of New Jersey. It could hardly be
thought, however, to further the goal of u nifying the several states. The
concern i s not so much, and certainly not only, possible offense to F l from
New Jersey's failure to adhere to Fl 's solution. When F2 gives greater
preclusi ve effect, it may impose concrete costs on Fl .7 1
By precluding a plaintiff from suing defendants that had been omitted
from a prior lawsuit in F l , which permitted but did not require their joinder
and would not bar a second lawsuit, New Jersey as F2 could effectively
deprive F l of the ability to control its own procedures. Such a regime could
shape future behavior72 by making the party joinder rules of New Jersey the
basis for litigation strategy decisions in Fl . The risk would be greatest with
respect to those for whom F2 was , or was feared to be , the only other
available, or practical , venue and for whom the disadvantages of two suits
(as opposed to one) in Fl exceeded the advantages_73
70. B urbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 1 , at 797 (footnote omitted).
Does not, however, the issue become whether the purposes underlying full faith and
credit are exhausted in accommodation of potentially conflicting policies of the
s ister states concerned or whether these purposes , even in the absence of actual or
potential conflict , call for solutions that facilitate multistate activity and minimize
the dislocations arising from the existence of state boundaries?
A . VoN MEHREN & D. TRAlJIMAN , supra note 30, at 1 459.
7 1 . "A rule of greater preclusive effects , once known , could have a consequential
impact on the conduct of the initial litigation , as risk-averse parties treat what should have
been a local skirmish as if it were a world war. This escalation would impose unwanted
costs on [F1 ] ." B urbank , Sources, supra note 1 , at 1 585 . See als o Graham C. Lilly , T11e
Symmetry of Preclusion, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 289, 3 1 2 ( 1 99 3 )
72. "To determine whether a rule is beneficial , a court must examine how that rule
.

influences future behavior." Premier E!ec. Constr. Co. v. National E!ec. Contractors Ass ' n ,
Inc . , 8 14 F .2d 358, 366 (7th Cir. 1987).

7 3 . Considering the implications of applying New Jersey ' s Entire Controversy
doctrine to determine the preclusive effects of a sister-state judgment, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit observed:
We note at least the theoretical possibility that such a holding might compel careful
l i tigators in other jurisdictions to raise all related claims and issues and seek all
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It might be argued that there is no imposition on F l or sacrifice of its
policy preferences - that, more colloquially, F l should not care - because its
own rules contemplate that a related l awsuit can be brought there . I do not
fi nd the argument persuasive. First, as just suggested, a litigant for whom
two suits, one in F l and the other elsewhere, would be preferable to one i n
F l may nonetheless prefer one suit i f the only alternative i s two i n F l . If so,
Fl ' s preference for party autonomy 74 would be sacrificed. Second, F l may
take the view that in such matters litigant preferences are also the best
measure of efficiencyJ 5 If so, F l 's view of efficient adjudication would be
sacrificed. Third, and more controversially, F l 's rules on this subject may
reflect the expectation that, at least in some instances, F l will not have to
bear all of the costs of dispute resolution that could result from leaving wide
scope to party autonomy, because parties will choose to pursue additional
litigation in other jurisdictions. If so, F l 's expectations would be frustrated.
D.

Preclusion in New Jersey " Without Prejudice "

If New Jersey i s not normally free to give greater preclusive effect, the
only remaining avoidance technique i s one that has also been suggested by
Professor Cooper, whereby F2 bars litigation i n its own courts but without
prejudice to litigation elsewhere J 6
There would be little profit in dwelling on the reasoning behind the New
Jersey supreme court's conclusion that the trial court had erred i n dismi ssing
the plaintiffs complaint with prejudice , even though the Entire Controversy
doctrine barred further litigation by the plaintiffs in New Jersey against the
defendants omitted in their federal action in Pennsylvania. There is irony i n
the use made by the court of its prior decision i n Watkins v . Resorts
available remedies in a single proceeding, because of the possibility that a
subsequent claim might arise in New Jersey. In this way , New Jersey would be
imposing on litigants and courts in other states its policy choice to encourage
parties to litigate all claims, defenses, issues , and remedies related to a p articular
transaction .
Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co . , Inc., 889 F.2d 4 1 , 45 n .6 (3d Cir. 1 989) .
74. See supra text accompanying note 69.
75. See F. JAMES ET AL. , supra note 68, § 9.8 , at 482-83; § 10 . 1 1 , at 525-26.
76. Where F 1 retains the requirement of mutuality and the question is
a defendant's efforts to preclude a plaintiff, the second court probably should be
free to dismiss a second action so as to protect its own interests in avoiding
repetitive litigation. It should not be free to enter judgment on the merits for the
defendant so as to preclude an action in another court.
E. COOPER , supra note 36 , § 4467 , at 648 . See also Lilly , supra note 7 1 , at 307-08 .
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International Hotel and Casino, Inc .17 The court borrowed some of
Watkins' technical apparatus, but not its sensitivity to i nterjurisdictional
obligations.78 The teleological nature of the conclusion "that a dismissal for
failure to comply with the entire controversy doctrine i s more similar to a
threshold adjudication than to an adjudication on the merits"79 i s plain.
It may be that the supreme court of New Jersey responded as it did to the
second question posed in MortgageLinq - ''what is the effect of . . .
preclusion [in New Jersey] in other jurisdictions?"8° -precisely to avoid the
conclusion suggested by full faith and credit analysis. The court was seeking
to justify the application of its own (F2) law in the face of serious
objections . 8 1 In its haste to accomplish that, the court failed to mark any
distinction among dismissals based on the Entire Controversy doctrine. As a
result, a dismissal for failure to join claims might be treated similarly, and
the same rule of non-preclusion outside of the New Jersey state courts would
apply if New Jersey were Fl (or both Fl and F2, with the question arising i n
F3) . 82
It remains to determine whether limiting the effects of F2' s more
broadly preclusive rule to F2 obviates any full faith and credit problems that
would otherwise exist. I conclude that two wrongs do not make a right. New
77. 1 24 N.J. 398 , 591 A .2d 592 ( 1 99 1 ) .
7 8 . See MortgageLinq, 142 N .J. 336, 345-48 , 662 A .2d 536 , 54 1 -42 ( 1 995 ) .
7 9 . !d. a t 347 , 66 2 A .2d a t 542 .
80. See supra text accompanying note 1 5 .
8 1 . "Although the majority precludes plaintiffs from suing in the [New Jersey] state
courts , it leaves them free to pursue a second action in the federal courts . To achieve this
result, the majority characterizes a state court dismissal based on the entire-controversy
doctrine as one without prejudice." MortgageLinq, 142 N.J. at 354-55 , 662 A .2d at 545
(Pollock, J . , dissenting) .
82. See id. at 347-4 8 , 662 A .2d at 542 . The court' s initial statement and defense of its
holding is limited to the "preclusive effect to our rules of party joinder." !d. at 3 3 8 , 662
A.2d at 537. Otherwise , the only qualification noted by the court appears to be based on an
erroneous premise. Thus, the court suggested that the question of preclusion in a diversity
action in New Jersey federal court as F2 might be governed by "choice-of-law principles."
!d. at 347-48 n .4 , 662 A .2d at 542 n .4 (cross-referencing Byrd v. B lue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop . , 356 U.S. 525 ( 1 958)). As Professor Degnan made clear, the case (assuming a
judgment i n the "prior state court action in New Jersey") is governed by the full faith and
credit statute, not the jurisprudence of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64 ( 1 938), and
its progeny. See Ronan E. Degnan , Federalized Res Judicata , 85 YALE L.J. 74 1 , 750-55
( 1 976) ; B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at 735 . Compare infra text
accompanying note 165 (no judgment) . For a recent decision proceeding from the same
erroneous premise , where the initial action was brought and went to judgment in New York
state court, see ltzkoff v . F & G Realty of New Jersey Corp . , 890 F.Supp. 35 1 (D.N.J. 1 995 ) .
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Jersey cannot satisfy its federal obligation as F2 by making it i mpossible for
other states to satisfy theirs as F3 . Put another way, New Jersey cannot
satisfy its federal obligation by transferring it to other jurisdictions.
In the course of its decision i n MortgageLinq, the New Jersey supreme
court observed that "fairness to the system of judicial administration," was ,
with "fairness to the parties," "[o]ne of the underpinnings of the entire
controversy doctrine : ·8 3 The court went on to assert that "[e] ach jurisdiction
is free to assess the importance of such values ."84 As a result, according to
the court:
If Pennsylvania courts do not have a

comparable party-j oinder rul e ,

principles o f comi ty suggest that New Jersey should not seek t o export i ts
entire controversy doctrine to regulate the conduct of attorneys i n that

attorneys conducting litigation in Pennsylvania
courts should not have to accommodate their practices to the demands of
New Jersey courts. A coroll ary of that proposi tion, however, i s that New

juri sdiction. In other words,

Jersey courts need not necessari ly grant relief when parties deliberately
refrai n from seeking relief in other j urisdictions when doi ng so wou l d have
been much fai rer to all parties i nvolved _ 85

Once it had found a way to implement this view of interjurisdictional
i nterests, the court sought comfort in the proposition that "[m]aintaining a
cohesive federal system (and the Full Faith and Credit Clause melds the state
courts into that system) does not require that the other parts of the federal
system honor our entire controversy doctrine."86
These are not choices for New Jersey to make . A literal approach to the
full faith and credit statute affords no more warrant for this departure by F2
from the preclusive effects that would be given in F l than for the more
drastic departure that dismissal with prejudice would portend . 87 Moreover,
eminent scholars long ago identified the failure to grasp that full faith and
credit is a national policy as a major vice of the Supreme Court' s decision in
83.
84 .
85 .
86.
87 .

MortgageLinq, 142 N.J. at 344 , 662 A .2d at 540.
!d. at 345 , 662 A .2d at 540.
/d. , 662 A .2d at 54 1 (emphasis added) .
!d. at 348 , 662 A .2d at 542 .
See supra note 1 8 . Note that the regime favored by Justice White , but which he
concluded was foreclosed by precedent, see supra text accompanying note 66, would have
permitted federal courts to apply their own , more broadly preclusive rules, "the p arties then
being free to relitigate in the state courts ." Migra v . Warren City Sch . Dist . B d . of Educ . ,

465 U . S . 7 5 8 8 ( 1 984) (White , J . , concurring).
,
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Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v . McCartin. 88 The result is that a state
has no business seeking to control the i nterjurisdictional effects of the
judgments of its courts.89 As of 1980 , a majority of the Court recognized the
problem, although stare decisis caused them to struggle for a solution.90
Precedent does not get in the way of clear thinking here.9 1
The choice of the preclusive effects i n F 1 as the measure of the federal
obligation has an advantage that is set in relief by MortgageLinq. Under
current law , states in the position of F2 are required only to do what the
courts of F 1 would do, a technique that furnishes an i nner political check
against self-regarding behavior. The court in MortgageLinq, to the contrary,
has used (an unauthorized version of) i nterjurisdictional preclusion law to
export litigation costs , laying down one rule for New Jersey and washing its
88. 3 30 U . S . 622 ( 1 947) .
8 9 . Full faith and credit i s a national policy, not a state policy . Its purpose is not
merely to demand respect from one state for another, but rather to give us the
benefits of a unified nation by altering the status of otherwise "independent,
sovereign states." Hence, it is for federal law , not state law , to prescribe the
measure of credit which one state shall give to another' s judgment.
Willis L .M . Reese & Vincent A. Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments,
49 COLUM . L. REv. 153 , 1 6 1 -62 ( 1 949) . See also A . VoN MEHREN & D . TRAUTMAN, supra
note 30 , at 1 459; Elliott E. Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause:
Magnolia Petroleum Co . v. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. REv. 3 30 , 338-41 ( 1 944).
90. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. , 448 U.S. 261 ( 1 980); id . at 290
(Rehnquist, J . , dissenting). Professor Dane ' s elegant commentary brings to mind a remark
attributed to his former colleague, the late Leon Lipson: "Anything you can do , I can do
meta." See Perry Dane, Sovereign Dignity and Glorious Chaos: A Comment on the
lnterjurisdictional lmplications of the Entire Controversy Doctrine , 28 RUTGERS L.J. 1 73
( 1 996) . But Professor Dane is admirably candid about his disagreement with the imputed
premises, and much of the law , of full faith and credit. See id. at text accompanying notes
4 , 10, 3 1 . As a result, his article also calls to mind the battles waged in Th omas and earlier
cases for the soul of full faith and credit. Unfortunately for Professor Dane , those who
favored the assimilation of "j udicial proceedings" to "laws" for purposes of federal control
lost the war. Fortunately for the rest of us , we do not need to suffer the costs of
interj urisdictional "anarchy ," id. text accompanying note 29, to which Professor Dane , as a
choice of law scholar, has become accustomed.
9 1 . I do not regard as pertinent here the Supreme Court ' s fumbling in cases involving
the interplay of full faith and credit and exclusive federal subject matter j urisdiction . In
speculating about the content of "state law" on a question that a state court can never
address , the Court has twice invoked rules or approaches that should have been irrelevant
because they were interjurisdictional . See Matsushita Elec. Indus . Co . , Ltd v. Epstein , 1 1 6
S . Ct. 873 ( 19%); Marrese v . American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons , 470 U.S. 373 ,
383 ( 1 985) . For discussion , see Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at

824-25.
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hands of possible sequelae in other jurisdictions. So much for full faith and
credit as a nationally unifying force .92
Finally , those who are nonetheless attracted to the MortgageLinq
solution because it appears functionally to respect the interests of both F l
and F2 should reconsider. As a practical matter, the supposed benefits of
mutual accommodation sought by the New Jersey supreme court can be
realized, and the cost of depriving F l of the power to control its own
procedures discussed above can be avoided , only if there are, or are thought
to be , adequate alternatives to New Jersey for subsequent litigation.93
Passing other potential barriers to suit, there is nothing to prevent other
states from taking the same position as F2 and thus, i n theory at least,
nothing to prevent the number of additional forums available as F2 from
shrinking to zero.94 The content of the federal obligation should not depend
upon such contingencies and calculations .95

E. Relaxing the Assumptions
1. Federal Court as F l

MortgageLinq in fact involved the preclusive effects to be given the
judicial proceedings of a federal court. Althou gh the New Jersey supreme
court did not pause over any impact that might have on its analysis, the
reason may be that, in the Watkins decision on which it relied i n other
92 . Although the New Jersey supreme court does not purport to dictate a rule for
other j urisdictions to follow , its approach might well encourage similarly self-regarding

behavior elsewhere . See infra text accompanying note 94.
The MortgageLinq court also exported what it claims is unfairness to parties , further
revealing its "without prejudice" solution as a self-inflicted wound whether New Jersey is
F2 or F l . See infra note 152.
I leave to others the question raised b y Professor Lilly, "[w] hether this ' door-closing'
posture is immune from a constitutional attack based on the argument that f-2 is unfairly
discriminating against f- 1 's law." Lilly, supra note 7 1 , at 308.
93 . See supra text accompanying notes 72-73. Recall that the MortgageLinq court
acknowledged that "attorneys conducting litigation in Pennsylvania courts should not have
to accommodate their practices to the demands of New Jersey courts ." MortgageLinq, 1 42
N.J. at 345 , 662 A .2d at 54 1 .
94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Agai n , I do not regard it as an adequate
answer that the related action can be brought in Fl . See supra text accompanying notes 74-

75.

95 . See A . VoN MEHREN & D . TRAUTMAN , supra note 30, a t 1 459 (quoted supra note
70). On this view, the MortgageLinq plaintiffs ' second federal lawsuit , see supra text
accompanying notes 1 2 and 1 4 , should be dismissed on proper motion.
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respects,96 the court had explored the question i n detai l . In any event,
because the scholarly literature already covers the ground , we need not pause
long over this aspect of the case.
a . Federal Question Judgment
The action brought in Pennsylvania federal court (F 1 ) involved both
state and federal claims .97 Still assuming that it went to judgment before the
New Jersey trial court (F2) ruled on the motions to dismiss, the l atter was
not free to disregard the judgment. For, although neither Article IV of the
Constitution nor the full faith and credit statute applies to the judicial
proceedings of federal courts , an obligation to respect them, equivalent i n
force and effect to full faith and credit, is found elsewhere i n federal l aw _98
To say that federal law requires a state court as F2 to respect federal
judicial proceedings is not to say what l aw furnishes the measure of that
respect. However, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court i ndicate ,
and analysis supports the conclusion, that federal preclusion law governs the
effects of the federal question judgment of a federal court.99 This federal law
subsumes, to the extent that it implements , the basic federal obligation of
respect 1 00 and is binding on state courts under the supremacy clause l 0 1 i n
the sense that it preempts any inconsistent state law .
Federal preclusion law would not have barred the plaintiffs i n
MortgageLinq from suing the New Jersey defendants i n federal court (which
is of course precisely what they attempted to do after the trial court
dismissed their New Jersey case) _ l 02 The only justification I can imagine for
permitting preclusion in New Jersey would be the notion that according
greater preclusive effect evinces no disrespect of, and portends no adverse
impact on, federal courts or the policies underlying federal law . In other
words, the notion would be that barring suit against the New Jersey
defendants in New Jersey state court would not be inconsistent with federal
96 . Watkins v. Resorts Int ' l Hotel & Casino, Inc . , 124 N.J.398 , 591 A .2d 592 ( 1 99 1 ) .

See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
97 . See MortgageLinq, 2 62 N. J.Super. 1 78, 1 82 , 620 A .2d 45 6 , 457 .
98 . See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 1 , at 740-47 .
99 . See, e.g . , B londer-Tongue Lab . , Inc . v . University of Ill . Found . , 402 U.S. 3 1 3 ,

324 n . l 2 ( 1 97 1 ); Stoll v . Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 1 65 ( 1 938); Deposit B ank v . Frankfort, 1 9 1
499 ( 1 903); B urbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at 762-78.
1 00 . See B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at 746 .
101 . U.S. CONST. art. VI , cl . 2.
102. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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l aw . The same analysis that casts doubt on that proposition for purposes of
full faith and credit applies here. 103
b. Diversity State Law Judgment
A more difficult problem of interjurisdictional preclusion would have
been presented if the federal case in F l had been a diversity state l aw action.
Although some courts and commentators, including perhaps the New Jersey
supreme court i n Watkins, 104 take the view that federal preclusion l aw also
and always governs the interjurisdictional effects of a federal judgment in
this situation, more careful analysis demonstrates that some questions are
governed by federal , and some by state, preclusion law _ l 05
How should New Jersey as F2 treat a federal diversity judgment
adjudicating matters of state law for purposes of party joinder and the Entire
Controversy doctrine? In order to answer the question, it may be helpful to
imagine -because it suggests starkly different preclusion regimes - that the
federal court (Fl ) sits i n New Jersey and that the governing substantive state
l aw is New Jersey l aw . On these assumptions, differences in the preclusion
l aw applicable to such a case could materially affect the character or result of
the litigation, as they could affect the choice of forum.
If that were all , the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the allocation
of federal and state lawmaking power 1 06 would strongly suggest that state
preclusion law (the Entire Controversy doctrine) furnished the measure of
respect due the federal diversity judgment. 107 This law would also be
binding on a state court as F2 under the mantle of the supremacy clause.
See discussion supra parts III .C- D .
104 . See Watkins v. Resorts Int ' l Hotel and Casino, Inc . , 1 24 N .J . 398 , 4 1 1 , 591
A .2d 592 , 598 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Degnan , supra note 82, at 755 -73.
105 . See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUIXJMENTS § 87 cmt. b ( 1 982); REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CoNFUcr OF LAWS § 95 cmt. h ( 1 988 rev .) ("When a federal j udgment
adjudicates claims under State law , State law , as a matter of federal law , may determine the
effects of the judgment."); Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at 7 78-97 .
1 06 .
See Walker v . Armco Steel Co . , 446 U . S . 740 ( 1 980); Hanna v . Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 ( 1 965 ) .
107 . It is true that preclusion rules are n o t made b y , and d o not have their ultimate
bite i n , the rendering court. But in fashioning preclusion rules for federal
judgments, federal courts are bound by federal statutes , including the Rules of
Decision Act and federal jurisdictional statutes . The purpose of the enterprise is
precisely to determine the law that will attend a federal diversity judgment and that
will bind all courts , federal and state , in which the judgment is subsequently raised.
Once that law is ascertained, it will not only furnish the rules prescribing the
103.

ultimate bite, but it may also affect the conduct of litigation in the rendering court.
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There i s more, however. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not,
and cannot validly, provide rules of preclusion, but they can validly
influence the creation or application of federal common l aw . 1 0 8 It is difficult
to make a persuasive argument for federal preclusion l aw on the basis of
emanations from the Federal Rules when the question i s the joinder of
claims, because it is difficult to tease a pertinent federal procedural policy
from Rule 18. 1 09 The case for federal common law is stronger when the
question is joinder of parties. For parties, unlike claims , the Federal Rules
lay down both the maximum scope of joinder 1 10 (the ceiling) and the
minimum scope 1 1 1 (the floor) .
P articularly when juxtaposed with Rule 20 , 1 1 2 Rule 1 9 can plausibly be
regarded as a statement of federal policy concerning the extent to which it is
appropriate for a federal trial court to override party autonomy _ 1 1 3 If so, that
policy would be frustrated by application of state preclusion l aw that more
tightly constrained party autonomy (by requmng more expansive party
As Professor Degnan recognized , albeit in a different context, " [i] f 'outcome
determinative ' is the relevant test . . . hardly anything is more dispositive than the
doctrine of res judicata ."
B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at 785-86 (footnote omitted) . See
also Lilly , supra note 7 1 , at 3 1 5 , 322 , 327 .
1 08 .
See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at 772-75 , 792, 795 .
See a lso Lilly , supra note 7 1 , at 320-2 1 .

109 . "A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim , counterclaim, cross
clai m , or third-party claim may join , either as independent or as alternate claims , as many
claims , legal , equitable, or maritime , as the party has against an opposing party." FED . R .
Civ . P . 1 8(a) .
'"May ' as used i n Rule 1 8(a) does not mean 'shall . ' ' Shall' in this context i s beyond
the competence of the Federal Rules, and 'may ' juxtaposed with ' sh al l , ' [in Rule 1 3(a)]
even if unauthorized, is a particularly feckless vehicle of policy ." Burbank ,
Interjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at 792 .
FED . R. C!v. P . 20 .
1 10 .
111.
FED. R . Civ . P . 1 9 .
1 1 2.
Rule 20 provides in pertinent part that:
[a]ll persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative , any right to relief in respect of
or arising out of the same transaction , occurrence , or series of transactions or
occurrences, and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise
in the action .
FED. R. C!v . P. 20(a) .
1 1 3 . See FED. R. Civ . P . 1 9; supra note 74 and accompanying text. See also Temple
v . Synthes Corp . , Ltd . , 498 U.S . 5 ( 1 990) (per curiam). "It has long been the rule that it is
not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit . . . .
Nothing in the 1 966 revision of Rule 1 9 changed that principle ." /d. at 7 .
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joinder) , since the content of the governing preclusion law would affect trial
strategy in the initi al action. 1 14 Perhaps that should be sufficient reason to
apply federal preclusion l aw , or at least to preempt state l aw on the
question. 1 15

2 . No Judgment in F l
When the trial court i n MortgageLinq granted the motions to dismiss
under the Entire Controversy doctrine, the plaintiffs ' federal case i n
Pennsylvania had not yet gone to judgment. 1 1 6 A t first blush, this fact may
seem to toll the thirteenth hour on the analysis to this point, casting doubt on
all that comes before . Even if the New Jersey supreme court reached the
right result, however, the court made nothing of this aspect i n answering the
first question posed , and the point is irrelevant to the second question. 1 1 7 In
addition, it is not as clear as it may first appear to be that the pendency of the
action in the trial court i n F l changes the result. It may be helpful to proceed
by resuscitating the other assumption i nitially made about F l , and then
relaxing that assumption.
a. State Court as Fl
Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor the full
faith and credit statute by its terms requires that there be a judgment i n Fl
before the obligation it imposes on F2 attaches . Both speak of "judicial
proceedings." 1 1 8 But the tendency to equate "judicial proceedings" and
"judgment" is natural , if only because the protection of sister state court
judgments was the central concern of the framers and the members of the
first Congress. 1 19 However, that was not their only concern.
Apart from the fact that both provisions refer to "acts" and "records ," the
evidence from the Constitutional Convention suggests that the term "judicial

1 14. For these purposes there is no need to be concerned about the locus of
subsequent litigation , because, once determined, the governing law , state or federal , will be
known in advance of the federal diversity action in F l . Compare supra text accompanying
notes 72-75 and 93-95 .
1 1 5 . Cf. Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at 795 (compulsory
counterclaims).
1 1 6 . See supra note 9.
1 1 7 . See supra text accompanying notes 1 5 and 22.
1 1 8 . Supra notes 1 7 and 1 8 .
1 19.

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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proceedings'' was thought to be broader than "judgment." 1 20 Moreover, the
Supreme Court recently recognized that a judgment i s the product of
"judicial proceedings" rather than a synonym for them. 1 2 1
A literal reading of the full faith and credit statute would require F2 to
preclude litigation that would be barred in F 1 because "judicial proceedings"
were already pending there. For instance, if F 1 followed the domestic l aw
doctrine variously known as "other action [or suit] pending" or "prior
pending action," 1 22 this reading of the statute would make that doctrine
binding "in every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions." 1 23
The notion may strike some as bizarre . The tradition that no bar arises
from the pendency of identical l awsuits in state courts or in state and federal
court suggests , if it does not require, the conclusion that there i s no federal
full faith and credit obligation to abate the l awsuit in F2, even though it
would be abated in F 1. 1 24
1 20.
See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF TIIE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1 7 8 7 , at
483-89 (rev. ed. 1937); Nadelmann, supra note 25 , at 58-59. See also Walter W . Cook, The
Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L .J . 42 1 , 429 ( 1 9 1 9)
(arguing that "judicial proceedings" in Article IV includes original process); Edward S .
Corwin, Th e "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 8 1 U. PA . L. REv . 37 1 , 3 8 8 ( 1 933)
(assumption that "judicial proceedings" refers only to j udgments seems "to be groundless") .
121.
"The judgment of a state court in a class action is plainly the product of a
'judicial proceeding' within the meaning of § 1 738 . . . . " Matsushita Elec . Indus. Co., Ltd.
v . Epstein , 1 1 6 S. Ct. 873, 878 ( 1 996) .
1 2 2 . See , e.g . , Sutcliffe Storage and Warehouse Co. , Inc. v . United States , 1 62 F.2d
849, 85 1 ( 1 st Cir. 1 947); Oliney v. Gardner, 7 7 1 F.2d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1 985); Allan D .
Vestal , Repetitive Litigation , 4 5 IowA L. REv . 525 ( 1 960).
123.
28 U.S.C. § 1 738 ( 1 996) . "[T] here are few clauses of the Constitution, the
merely literal possibilities of which have been so little developed as the ' full faith and
credit' clause." Corwin , supra note 1 20 , at 388.
1 24. See , e.g . , Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v . United States , 424 U.S. 800,
8 1 7 ( 1 976); McClellan v. C arland , 2 1 7 U.S. 268 , 282 ( 1 9 10); E. CooPER, supra note 36,
§ 4404, at 23 .
But a controversy is not a thing, and a controversy over a mere question of personal
liability does not involve the possession or control of a thing, and an action brought
to enforce such a liability does not tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the
court in which a prior action for the same cause is pending. Each court is free to
proceed in its own way and in its own time without reference to the proceedings in
the other court. Whenever a judgment is rendered in one of the courts and pleaded
in the other, the effect of that judgment is to be determined by the application of
the principles of res adjudicata by the court in which the action is still pending in
the orderly exercise of its j urisdiction , as it would determine any other question of
fact or law arising in the progress of the case . The rule, therefore , has become
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joinder) , since the content of the governing preclusion law would affect trial
strategy in the initial action. 1 14 Perhaps that should be sufficient reason to
apply federal preclusion law , or at least to preempt state l aw on the
question. 1 15

2 . No Judgment i n F l
When the trial court in MortgageLinq granted the motions to dismiss
under the Entire Controversy doctrine, the plaintiffs ' federal case in
Pennsylvania had not yet gone to judgment_l 1 6 At first blush, this fact may
seem to toll the thirteenth hour on the analysis to this point, casting doubt on
all that comes before. Even if the New Jersey supreme court reached the
right result, however, the court made nothing of this aspect in answering the
first question posed , and the point is irrelevant to the second question. 1 1 7 In
addition, it is not as clear as it may first appear to be that the pe ndency of the
action i n the trial court i n F l changes the result. It may be helpful to proceed
by resuscitating the other assumption initially made about F l , and then
relaxing that assumption.
a. State Court as F l
Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor the full
faith and credit statute by its terms requires that there be a judgment i n F l
before the obligation i t imposes on F2 attaches . Both speak o f "judicial
proceedings :• 1 1 8 But the tendency to equate "judicial proceedings" and
"judgment" is natural , if only because the protection of sister state court
judgments was the central concern of the framers and the members of the
first Congress . 1 19 However, that was not their only concern.
Apart from the fact that both provisions refer to "acts" and "record s ," the
evidence from the Constitutional Convention suggests that the term "judicial

1 14 . For these purposes there is no need to be concerned about the locus of ·
subsequent litigation , because, once determined, the governing law, state or federal , will be
known in advance of the federal diversity action in Fl . Compare supra tex t accompanying
notes 72-75 and 93-95 .
1 15 . Cj. B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at 795 (compulsory
counterclaims).
1 1 6 . See supra note 9.
1 17.
1 18.
1 19.

See supra text accompanying notes 1 5 and 22.
Supra notes 1 7 and 1 8 .
See supra note 2 5 and accompanying text.
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proceedings" was thought to be broader than "judgment." 1 20 Moreover, the
Supreme Court recently recognized that a judgment i s the product of
"judicial proceedings" rather than a synonym for them. 1 2 1
A literal reading of the full faith and credit statute would require F2 to
preclude litigation that would be barred in F l because "judicial proceedings"
were already pending there. For i nstance, if F I followed the domestic l aw
doctrine variously known as "other action [or suit] pending" or "prior
pending action," 1 22 this reading of the statute would make that doctrine
binding "in every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions ." 1 2 3
The notion may strike some as bizarre. The tradition that no bar arises
from the pendency of identical lawsuits in state courts or in state and federal
court suggests , if it does not require , the conclusion that there i s no federal
full faith and credit obligation to abate the l awsuit in F2, even though it
would be abated in F I . 1 24
1 20. See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1 78 7 , at
483-89 (rev . ed. 1 937); Nadelmann, supra note 25 , at 5 8-59. See also Walter W . Cook, The
Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause , 28 YALE L .J . 42 1 , 429 ( 1 9 1 9)
(arguing that "judicial proceedings" in Article IV includes original process); Edward S .
Corwin , The "Full Faith and Credit " Clause, 8 1 U. PA . L . REv . 37 1 , 388 ( 1 933)
(assumption that "judicial proceedings" refers only to judgments seems "to be groundless") .
1 2 1 . "The judgment of a state court in a class action is plainly the product of a
'judicial proceeding' within the meaning of § 1 738 . . . . " Matsushita Elec . Indus . Co. , Ltd.
v. Epstein , 1 1 6 S. Ct. 873 , 878 ( 1 996) .
1 22 . See, e.g . , Sutcliffe Storage and Warehouse Co. , Inc. v . United States , 1 62 F.2d
849, 85 1 ( 1 st Cir. 1 947); Oliney v. Gardner, 7 7 1 F.2d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1 985); Allan D .
Vestal , Repetitive Litigation , 4 5 IOWA L. REv . 525 (1960).
123.
28 U . S . C . § 1 738 ( 1 996) . " [T]here are few clauses of the Constitution, the
merely literal possibilities of which have been so little developed as the ' full faith and
credit ' clause ." Corwin , supra note 1 20 , at 388.
1 24 . See, e.g . , Colorado River Water Conserv . Dist. v . United States , 424 U.S. 800 ,
8 1 7 ( 1 976); McClellan v . Carland, 2 1 7 U.S. 268 , 282 ( 1 9 10); E. CCX)FER, supra note 36,
§ 4404, at 23 .
But a controversy is not a thing, and a controversy over a mere question of personal
liability does not involve the possession or control of a thing, and an action brought
to enforce such a liability does not tend to impair or defeat the j urisdiction of the
court in which a prior action for the same cause is pending. Each court is free to
proceed in its own way and in its own time without reference to the proceedings in
the other court. Whenever a judgment is rendered in one of the courts and pleaded
in the other, the effect of that judgment is to be determined by the application of
the principles of res adjudicata by the court in which the action is still pending in
the orderly exercise of its jurisdiction , as it would determine any other question of
fact or law arising in the progress of the case . The rule, therefore , has become
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Yet, there is nothing inevitable about this result. Indeed , some early
cases suggested that full faith and credit might be interpreted to nationalize a
domestic "other action pending" defense. 1 25 History went the other way, 1 26
to the point that an amendment of the statute may be necessary to change the
l aw . But Congress had no problem barring duplicative simultaneous
litigation in the child custody area, and its action in that regard may be
further support for the proposition that at least the "judicial proceedings"
referred to in the Constitution need not have culminated in a judgment. 1 27
Is it necessarily true, then , that if F l i n MortgageLinq had been a state
court, New Jersey as F2 would not have violated federal law by barring suit
against omitted defendants prior to judgment in F l ? The traditional view
regarding parallel actions in different states strongly suggests if New Jersey
had been F1 and no judgment had been entered, full faith and credit would
not have required another state as F2 to abate even though the courts of New
Jersey would do so. Are there differences between the two situations that
might support different results under the full faith and credit statute?
The conclusion that there is no violation of the full faith and credit
statute if F2 entertains litigation that would be barred in F l because of
another action pending can usually be justified by reference to the rules and
policies of domestic preclusion law. 128 Pendency of the action i n Fl usually
generally established that where the action first brought is in personam and seeks
only a personal judgment, another action for the same cause in another j urisdiction
is not precluded.
Kline v . B urke Constr. Co . , 260 U.S. 226, 230 ( 1 922) .
1 25 . See, e.g . , Hart v. Granger, 1 Conn. 1 54 ( 1 8 14); Vestal , supra note 122, at 52830.

See , e.g . , Stanton v . Embrey, 93 U.S. 548 , 554 ( 1 877) .
A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody
127.
determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of
another State where such court of that other State is exercising j urisdiction
consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody determi n ation .
28 U.S .C. § 1 738A(g) ( 1 996) .
Although this is not a necessary inference (because the statute can be j ustified o n other
grounds) , it is evidence against the assertion that "[t]he essential characteristic of 'judicial
proceedings ' within the meaning of the full faith and credit clause is the property of being
res judicata ." Albert S . Abel , Administrative Determinations and Full Faith and Credit, 22
IOWA L . RE v . 46 1 , 5 16 ( 1 937). In any event, the author's assertion i s unsupported by
reasoning and appears a transparent attempt to ease the way for full faith and credit to
administrative determinations .
128. That is not because preclusion i s the central federal policy; it is rather the area
of concern that led to Article IV and the implementing statute, which have a broader policy.

1 26.

See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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signifies that no domestic rule of preclusion is applicable , which in tum
means that i n F l the policies of finality, repose and reliance are not
sufficiently implicated to require protection. 1 2 9
To be sure, a domestic "other action pending" or "prior pending action"
defense can be thought to protect some of the same interests , in particular the
interest of litigants in freedom from harassment. To the extent, however, that
such a defense is designed to protect F l 's judicial resources , they require no
protection if F2 is a court i n another state or a federal court. Moreover, there
are other i nterests , including those of F2 , at stake.
It would not be irrational for Congress to conclude that duplicative
litigation is a sufficiently serious national problem to warrant overriding the
interests at stake in the litigation in F2 prior to judgment in F l (at least if F l
would then bar such litigation) . But keeping in mind the problems that
brought forth the constitutional provision, neither was it irrational for courts
to fail to impute that interpretation to its implementing statute.
A judgment is not, however, an infallible marker for the existence of full
faith and credit concerns. It is not even a reliable prerequisite for preclusion
in domestic l aw.
The first test of the proposition that there can be no violation of the full
faith and credit statute unless there is a judgment in Fl comes as a result of
developments in modem issue preclusion law. There is authority for the rule
that in some circumstances a finding can be given preclusive effect before
there is a judgment. This approach gives finality a different meaning for
issue preclusion purposes than it has for claim preclusion purposes. 1 30 If F l
has adopted this rule, surely i t is too facile to let F2 off the hook by insisting
that "judicial proceedings" means "judgment." 1 3 1 For, here both the
domestic preclusion law of Fl and the broader full faith and credit policy of
unifying the country support requiring F2 to follow F I ) 3 2

1 29.
"Judicial actions must achieve a basic minimum quality to become eligible for
res judicata effects . The traditional words used to describe this quality require that there be
a judgment that is valid, final, and on the merits." E . COO PER supra note 36, § 4427 , at 269.
1 30 . See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co . , 297 F.2d 80 , 89 (2d Cir.
1 96 1 ) , cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 ( 1 962); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 3
( 1 982).
1 3 1 . But see E. CooPER , supra note 36 , § 4467 , at 643. "More conservative courts
should be free to litigate the same issues- here , if nowhere else , it seems clear that there is
not yet any judgment, and the vague full fai th and credit terminology of 'judicial
proceedings ' should not be expanded beyond judgments at this late date." /d.
1 3 2 . See supra text accompanying notes 45-46. To the extent that according such
preclusive effect were discretionary in F l , F2 would have the same discretion .
,
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Attention to this broader policy suggests that there may be a relevant
difference between my hypothetical variant of MortgageLinq and the case i n
which New Jersey is F l - the second test of the proposition. I n the l atter
case, where it appears clear that another state' s courts or a federal court
would not be required to preclude, although New Jersey courts would
preclude, prior to judgment, 1 33 the i nterests of New Jersey are captured i n
the policies that it has imputed to the Entire Controversy doctrine. To the
extent that they are the policies of preclusion law , as discussed above, prior
to judgment in New Jersey, they are not implicated to the degree necessary
to require other states or the federal courts to surrender whatever interests
may be at stake in the litigation filed there. Moreover, New Jersey' s interest
in protecting its judicial resources does not in this situation require federal
protection. 1 34 Finally , there i s little risk that the failure to require F2 to
preclude prior to judgment will deprive New Jersey as F l of the ability to
control its own procedures. The fact that full faith and credit does require
preclusion in F2 after judgment in F l 1 3 5 should prevent litigants from
gambling on a rush to judgment in F2 by ignoring the Entire Controversy
doctrine in F l .
When New Jersey is F2 the absence of a judgment i n F l does not
eliminate the impact F2' s application of the Entire Controversy doctrine may
have, in future cases, on F l . The relevant decisions regarding litigation
strategy in F l will have been made long before the case is over, and the
plaintiff may not be able to wait until the case is over to file i n F2. If one
believes that permitting New Jersey to apply the Entire Controversy doctrine
as F2 would violate full faith and credit when there is a judgment in F l , 1 36 it
is hard to defend a contrary result when there is not.
Reliance on tradition usually justifies the equation of "judicial
proceedings" and "judgment." But there is no tradition on the duty of F2 to
follow the latest development in F l ' s domestic preclusion l aw , and the
tradition on the question of greater preclusive effect does not require the
existence of a judgment in F l for its intellectual support. 1 37 Perhaps for such
cases we ought to read the statute literally in light of its dominant purpose. If
we do that, New Jersey would violate full faith and credit by applying the
1 33 .

Here I am disregarding New Jersey's attempt to deprive j udgments enforcing
its Entire Controversy doctrine of extra-territorial effect. See supra text accompanying
notes 75-94; infra text accompanying note 1 46.
1 34 . See supra text accompanying note 1 29.
1 35 . See infra text accompanying note 1 50.
1 36. See discussion supra parts III .C-D.
1 37 . See discussion supra part III .C .
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Entire Controversy doctrine to preclude suit against parties omitted i n an
action in F 1 even before that action went to judgment.
b. Federal Court as F 1
Finally, we reach the case that was before the New Jersey supreme court
in MortgageLinq. For these purposes we need not be concerned about the
traditional i nterpretation of the full faith and credit statute , or about that
statute at all . On the other hand, alternative explanations of the source of the
obligation to respect federal judicial proceedings or of the l aw that governs
the preclusive effects thereof do not provide nourishment if they must
assume the existence of a judgment. Not all of them must do so.
Federal common law is the source of the obligation to respect federal
judgments , as it is likely to be the source of any federal rule of preclusion
defining the measure of respect that they are due_ l 38 The existence of
pertinent and valid federal common l aw obviously does not depend generally
on the existence of a federal judgment. 1 3 9 Moreover, preemptive federal l aw,
which is a subset of federal common law, 140 is as legitimate when necessary
to protect federal procedural interests as it is when necessary to protect
federal substantive interests _ 1 4 1
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not statutes, and mischief can
follow from the assumption that they are . l 42 The Federal Rules are,
however, provided for by a federal statute 143 and should be treated as if they
were statutes for the purpose of considering whether they justify the creation
(or application) of federal common law _ 144
See supra text accompanying notes 97- 10 1 .
See B urban k , Interjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at 753-62, 783-9 1 .
See Thomas W . Merrill, Th e Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U .
RE v . 1 , 3 2- 39 ( 1 985); Burbank , /nterjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , a t 808

1 38 .
1 39.
140.
Cm . L .

n . 3 60.
1 4 1 . See, e .g . , Tullock v . Mulvane , 1 84 U.S. 497 , 5 12-1 3 ( 1 902).
1 42 . See Stephen B . Burbank, Th e Rule Enabling Act of 1 934 , 1 30 U . PA . L . REv .
1 0 1 5 , 1 102, 1 1 77-78 ( 1 982) .
143. See 28. U S .C § § 2072-74 ( 1 994).
144. See supra text accompanying note 107 . "Even when legal regulation in a certain
.

.

area is forbidden to the [Federal] Rules, the policies underlying valid Rules may help to
shape valid federal common law ." B urbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion , supra note 1 , at
774 (footnote omitted).
To hold the contrary . . . would be but to declare that although the power conferred
by Congress upon this Court to adopt equity rules is controlling , nevertheless the
interpretations of the rules and the limitations which arise from a proper

1 16
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If the application of the Entire Controversy doctrine by New Jersey as
F2 would frustrate F l ' s policy on party autonomy as reflected i n Rule 1 9 ,
thereby depriving the federal court of the power to control its own
procedures , 145 that effect would occur long before there was a judgment i n
federal court. Moreover, the impact of the holding in MortgageLinq that a
dismissal i n New Jersey is "without prejudice" would be no different i n this
situation than it would be if there were a judgment i n Fl . Here too one can
imagine contingencies that would require the federal courts to sacrifice their
own , and to bear the costs of New Jersey' s procedural policies . l 46
One response to this line of reasoning might be that, if federal l aw
indeed governs the preclusive effects of a federal judgment on the question
involved in MortgageLinq, the plaintiff can avoid any difficulty simply by
waiting to file suit in New Jersey . But, as a result of a l ooming limitations
bar or other reasons , that may be a matter beyond the plaintiff' s control.
Remembering the law that governs once there is a judgment is useful ,
however, since we can now see that permitting New Jersey to apply the
Entire Controversy doctrine before judgment would undermine not only
Rule 1 9 but federal judge-made preclusion law as wel l .
The displacement or preemption of state law in order t o protect federal
i nterests usually occurs in the proceeding , federal or state , i n which that
interest is directly involved. But there is no requirement to that effect, as the
process of determining the l aw that governs the preclusive effects of federal
judgments itself demonstrates . l 47 The real question here , as when
assumptions were made in order to ease the way for full faith and credit
analysis , is whether the federal interests are sufficiently important, and the
threat to those interests sufficiently plausible, to justify the displacement of
state law.
IV. NEW JERSEY AS THE FIRST FORUM (F l )
A consideration of the questions asked and answered by the court i n
MortgageLinq has already entai led some attention to the status of New
Jersey as F I . 148 It may be useful to bring together prior analysis that bears
construction of them, as expounded by this court and enunciated i n its decision s ,
are without avai l .
Tullock v . Mulvan e , 1 84 U . S . 497 , 5 1 3 ( 1 902).
145 . See supra text accompanying notes 96- 1 1 5 .
146. See supra text accompanying notes 76-95 .
147. See supra note 1 07 and accompanying text.
1 48 . See , e .g . , supra text accompanying note 82.
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on this situation and to complete the picture by sketching i n a few missing
details.

A. New Jersey State Court
New Jersey enforces its views concerning the mandatory joinder of
parties through something called •<the Entire Controversy doctrine," not res
judicata" or ..preclusion," and the effect of its application i s far beyond
anything known to preclusion l aw in 1 790 . Neither the l abel used nor the
fact that in this application the doctrine is a modem development suffices to
negate the obligations otherwise imposed by the full faith and credit clause
and its implementing statute. In that regard , it bears emphasis that the New
Jersey courts have treated this aspect of the doctrine as functionally related
to, and a logical outgrowth of, the doctrine as applied to claims and have
justified both according to the conventional goals of preclusion law.
Moreover, the effect of precluding suit against persons not joined as required
by the doctrine is to preclude a plaintiff's claims against those persons . 1 49
Similarly, there is no basis in the statute, the cases i nterpreting it, or
contemporary attitudes towards preclusion, to except from the federal
obligation rules of F1 that are deemed to be outside the ··central core"
because not sufficiently related to the supposed central values of preclusion.
In any event, such analysis could not stand alone because it fails to reflect
the central policy of full faith and credit- the unification of the country
through respect for the judicial proceedings of Fl . 1 50
Thus, even if New Jersey's (Fl 's) Entire Controversy doctrine as applied
to parties were thought to fall outside the ··central core ," F2 should not be
permitted to disregard the doctrine in subsequent litigation there , because to
do so would deprive New Jersey of the power to control its own procedures.
New Jersey's different view of party autonomy and of the putatively most
efficient litigation package is entitled to protection.
..

1 49. See supra text accompanying notes 28-35 . Professor Dan e ' s characterization of
the Entire Controversy doctrine as penalizing party behavior may not be a "subterfuge ,"
Dane , supra note 90, at 1 86, but neither does it suffice to disengage the doctrine from its
oft-proclaimed domestic law roots in preclusion law or from the i nterjurisdictional
consequences that those roots entail . Claim preclusion , which after all is a subset of the
same doctrine, can be explained in similar terms . Moreover, it is precisely because the
MortgageLinq court 's "without prejudice" solution is so obviously self-defeating from the
perspective of fairness to parties , see supra note 92 and infra note 152, that the perspective
itself seems , if not a "subterfuge," then an after-thought .
1 50 . See supra text accompanying notes 36-55.
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The rule announced in MortgageLinq that entire controversy dismissals
are ..without prejudice" i nterjuri sdictionally was apparently i ntended to
apply when New Jersey is F l as well as when it is F2. 1 5 1 It is not, I have
argued , a rule that New Jersey is empowered to mak:e . 152 If so, it is also not
a rule that courts of other states or federal courts (F2) are empowered to
follow. Precisely because the rule would have most of its bite i n cases in
which New Jersey was F l , as announced in MortgageLinq it would appear
to be a violation not just of the state' s obligations as F2, but also of its
obligations as F l .
Perhaps , however, this situation should be distinguished by analogy to
the traditional full faith and credit treatment of statute of limitations
dismissal s . A plaintiff whose suit in F l is dismissed on limitations grounds
and who is barred from suing again on the same claim in F l is nevertheless
usually free to sue in any other jurisdiction whose limitations l aw will
permit it. 1 5 3 Are there reasons why the Entire Controversy doctrine should
be treated differently (when New Jersey is F l )? 1 54
The special treatment of limitations dismissals is the product of the
traditional , largely discredited choice of law approach to limitations _ l 55 For
that reason alone, it is not a good candidate for extension into other areas . 1 56
151.
152.

See supra text accompanying note 82.
See supra text accompanying notes 87-95 . From the perspective of fairness to

parties , it is also a self-inflicted wound, leaving the objects of the state ' s concern subject to
suit in other jurisdictions . See supra note 92, 149.
1 5 3 . See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCf OF LAWS § 1 10 cmts . a & b ( 1 988
rev .) ; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 9 cmt . f, reporter's note ( 1 982).
1 54 . Any attempt to use the analogy to salvage such treatment of a dismissal by New
Jersey as F2, which I have analyzed separately , see supra text accompanying notes 76-95 ,
encounters additional objection s . The limitations rule does not pose for litigants the
problems of predictability that the New Jersey scheme entails, even if dismissal is "without
prejudice ," and does not deprive F1 of the power to control its own procedure s .
155. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCf OF LAWS § 142 ( 1 988 rev .). "We think
that the statute of limitations should be dealt with in much the same way as any other
choice of law problem, and that we should no longer be bound by the notion that it is
procedural ." 65 A .L .I . PROC. 322 ( 1988) .
Professor Dane regards the modern choice of law approach to statutes of limitation s ,
which is favored by the American Law Institute, as "reductive a n d doctrinaire and
unnecessary." Dane, supra note 90, at 1 88 . I am honored. Cf. American Nat ' l Red Cross v .
S .G . , 505 U.S. 247 , 256 n . 7 ( 1 992).
1 56 . It "represents but a reflex of the traditional , monolithic approach to statutes of
limitations and is hardly good authority." Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion, supra
note 1 , at 797 n . 3 1 7 . See infra note 1 60 . Note , however, that the American Law Institute
made changes in section 1 10 of the Restatement only to the extent necessary to reflect
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Also, any attempt categorically or functionally to exempt from the obligation
of full faith and credit adjudications based on Fl 's "procedural" rules would
quickly run up against the reality that preclusion law is to a great extent a
reflection of procedure, 1 5 7 as well as the important role that the federal
obligation plays in enabling F l to control its own procedures. 1 5 8
I f the supposed analogy preserved the New Jersey scheme from a full
faith and credit violation, there would be no apparent basis on which to
distinguish dismissals for failure to join claims, to which that scheme seems
also intended to apply_ l5 9 For that matter, what basis would there be to
distinguish the decision by any state to make dismissals under any aspect of
its domestic preclusion l aw "with prejudice" internall y but "without
prejudice" extemally? 1 60 What then would remain of the underlying federal
changes made to section 142. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 10
reporter' s note ( 1 988 rev.). See also infra note 1 60.
1 5 7 . See , e.g . , Williamson v . Columbia Gas & Elec . Corp . , 1 86 F.2d 464, 469-70 (3d
Cir.

1950) , cert . denied, 341 U.S. 921 ( 1 95 1 ) .

In holding that full faith and credit did not require a federal court to give effect to the
rendering state ' s compulsory counterclaim rule, a panel of the Fifth Circuit distinguished
between the purposes of "essentially procedural res judicata rules" animated by an "interest
in judicial economy" that is "local in scope," and "the national interest in avoiding
relitigation of adjudicated issues." Chapman v. Aetna Finance Co. , 61 5 F.2d 36 1 , 363 (5th
Cir. 1 980) . The distinction would exempt from the federal obligation a good deal of modem
claim preclusion law, which is reason enough to reject it. See also Virginia-Carolina Chern.
Co. v. Kirven , 2 1 5 U.S. 252, 260 ( 1 909) (conclusion that federal judgment not res judicata
impossible if state code of procedure , applicable in the federal action , in fact required
defendant "to set up his demand for damages [counterclaim] in the answer'') .
I have previously argued that "[i] n recognizing the interdependence of procedure and
substance . . . it is not necessary , although it may be convenient, to reject the utility of any
attempt to develop rules or standards for court rulemaking purposes ." B urbank, supra note
142, at 1 1 88. I am, therefore , sympathetic to Professor Dane ' s attempt to draw lines
between procedure and substance . See Dane, supra note 90, at text accompanying notes 222 3 , 44-46. To avoid the costs of essentialism, however, one must keep in mind the purpose
of the line-drawing exercise.
Law reformers have long assured us that procedure is technical , details - in short,
adjective law. Whatever the accuracy of those labels as to other matters, only in
Wonderland do they describe rules of preclusion .
Stephen B . B urbank, Afterwords: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment on
Marrese, 70 CoRNELL L. REv. 659, 662 ( 1 985) (footnote omitted) .
1 5 8 . See supra text accompanying notes 72-7 3 .
1 59. See supra text accompanying note 82 and note 149.

1 60 . It is not clear how far the principle underlying the effect of dismissals based on
the statute of limitations does or should extend. Should it extend, for example, to a
dismissal based on the statute of frauds if the second jurisdiction has a different
statute that would lead to a different result? Neither authority nor policy lends firm
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policy? 'The force of [full faith and credit] is not so weak that it can be
evaded by mere mention of the word[s] [without prejudice] ." 1 6 1 Otherwise,
"States would . . . be free to nullify for their own people the legislative
decisions that Congress has made on behalf of all the People ." 1 62
Accordingly, when defendants are omitted from litigation i n New Jersey
state court in violation of the Entire Controversy doctrine, once that
litigation comes to judgment, the courts of every other state and the federal
courts are obligated to preclude another lawsuit to the s ame extent that it
would be precluded in New Jersey. With one exception, however, the
obligation does not arise prior to judgment in F1 , even though a subsequent
suit in New Jersey would then be precluded. l 63 The courts of F2 are free to
preclude if authorized by domestic law , but federal law does not require
them to do so _ l 64
The exception arises in state law diversity actions in federal court in
New Jersey commenced after a state court action to which New Jersey' s
party joinder rule applies . It would materially affect the character or result of
such actions if the federal court were free to entertain a case that would be
barred in New Jersey state court and the difference would also affect the
choice of forum. The policies animating Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not require protection in this situation, as they arguably
do when the first action is filed in federal court, and there is no other
plausible basis for the federal court to refuse to apply state l aw _ 1 65
support to nonpreclusion in such a case. Indeed, nonpreclusion seems questionable
even with respect to the statute of limitation s .
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 9 cmt. f, reporter's note ( 1 982).
Professor Dane assures u s that h i s argument relying o n the issue preclusive , b u t not
claim preclusive , nature of "non-merits dismissals," Dane , supra note 90, at 1 90, "is not
just an academic gloss" nor "mere trickery or sleight of hand." !d. Perhaps not, but the
argument does not address the evident incompatibility with the purposes of full faith and
credit of permitting New Jersey to distinguish between merits and non-merits dismissals
according to its view of interjurisdictional , as opposed to domestic , need s . See supra text
accompanying note 92.
1 6 1 . Howlett v. Rose, 496 U . S . 356, 382-83 ( 1 990) (supremacy clause) .
1 62 . !d. at 383 .
1 63 . See supra text accompanying notes 1 33-35 .
164 . " A state court , i n conformity to state policy, may, by comity , give a remedy
which the full faith and credit clause does not compel." Milwaukee County v . M . E. White
C o . , 296 U . S . 268 , 272 ( 1 935).
1 65 . See supra text accompanying notes 104- 1 1 5 . Cf. Seaboard Finance Co. v.
Davis , 276 F. Supp. 507 (N .D. Ill. 1 967) (federal diversity court as F2 must apply Illinois
prior pending action statute when Il linois state courts would do so, here because of case
pending in California as F 1 ) . Compare supra note 82 (judgment) .
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B. New Jersey Federal Court
Consideration of New Jersey 's obligations as F2 required attention to
situations i n which F l was a federal court. That analysis supports the
conclusion that federal l aw governs the preclusive effects of the federal
question judgment of a federal court, and it makes no difference where that
federal court sits . 1 66 The same conclusion was suggested for a state l aw
diversity judgment, where the situation chosen for the analysis envisioned
F l as a federal court sitting in New Jersey applying New Jersey substantive
l aw . The conclusion i s , however, not as firm and requires a sensitive
appreciation of the interplay between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and federal common law. 1 67
Finally, if the initial federal action in MortgageLinq had been brought in
New Jersey, the question presented would have been whether New Jersey
could preclude a subsequent state court action prior to judgment in F l .
Consideration of the federal court's procedural interests , reflected i n Rule
1 9 , suggests that, even before judgment, federal common la\\: would preempt
the application of the Entire Controversy doctrine. If so, it would make no
difference whether the federal court action had been brought to adjudicate a
federal question or in diversity to adjudicate state law claims . 168
V. CONCLUSION
The Entire Controversy doctrine may be unique to New Jersey , but it
furnishes a fertile field in which to cultivate questions , the answers to which
are of significance far beyond its borders .
Perhaps the most interesting of those questions relates to the supposed
equivalence of ..judicial proceedings" and judgments for purposes of the full
faith and credit statute. I have suggested that the equivalence is not
complete, that i n some circumstances where there has not yet been a
judgment i n Fl , the statute obligates F2 to act as F l would. In other words, I
have suggested that the court in MortgageLinq was wrong on the facts of the
case, as well as on assumptions relating to distinctions it deemed irrelevant.
Note that a federal diversity court in New Jersey, sitting as F2, would also be required
to apply the Entire Controversy doctrine after judgment in

F1 if full faith and credit

permitted New Jersey to, and it would, do so (i.e., give greater preclusive effect) .
166. See supra text accompanying notes 96- 103.
1 67 . See supra text accompan ying notes 104-15 .
1 68 . See supra text accompanying notes 1 38-47 .
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But the matter deserves, and I hope to give it, more intensive historical and
analytical attention.

